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Abstract— Cyber-physical systems (CPS) such as autonomous
vehicles rely on both on-board sensors and external commu-
nications to estimate their state. Unfortunately, these commu-
nications render the system vulnerable to cyber-attacks. While
many attack detection methods have begun to address these con-
cerns, they are limited to linear time-invariant (LTI) systems.
Though LTI system models provide accurate approximations
for CPS such as autonomous vehicles at constant speed and
turning radii, they are inaccurate for more complex motions
such as lane changes, turns, and changes in velocity. Since these
more complex motions are more suitably described by linear
time-varying (LTV) system models rather than LTI models,
Dynamic Watermarking, which adds a private excitation to
the input signal to validate measurements, has recently been
extended to LTV systems. However, this extension does not
allow for LTV systems that require several steps before the
effect of a given control input can be seen in the measurement
signal. Additionally, there is no consideration for the time-
varying effects of auto-correlation. Furthermore, a proof of
concept was only provided using simulations of a simplified
model.
This paper relaxes the requirement for inputs to be visible
in a single step and constructs an auto-correlation normalizing
factor to remove the effects of auto-correlation. In addition,
Dynamic Watermarking is applied to a high-fidelity vehicle
model in CarSim™and a 1/10 scale autonomous rover to further
reinforce the proof of concept for realistic systems. In each case,
the vehicle follows a predefined path with time-varying velocity
and turning radii. A replay attack, which replays previously
recorded measurements, is shown to be detectable using LTV
Dynamic Watermarking in a quick and repeatable manner.
I. INTRODUCTION
For cyber-physical systems (CPS) to operate in a safe
and efficient manner, their communications must remain
secure. The difficulty of securing such systems has been
illustrated in a variety of cases [1]–[3]. While most schemes
to detect whether such systems have been attacked have
focused on linear time-invariant (LTI) systems, CPS such
as autonomous vehicles (AV)s often require more complex
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Fig. 1. This paper describes the application and detection of deception
attacks via LTV Dynamic Watermarking. Proof of concept is shown using
a high fidelity car model in CarSim™(top) and a 1/10 scale autonomous
rover (bottom).
models. To overcome this, one particular scheme, Dynamic
Watermarking, has recently been extended to linear time-
varying (LTV) systems by Porter et al. [4]. Unfortunately
this extension does not allow for systems that require several
steps before the effect of a given control input is seen in
the measurement and does not take into account the time-
varying effects of auto-correlation. Furthermore, no real-
world implementation of this method has been proposed.
This paper relaxes the requirement for inputs to be visible
in a single step and constructs an auto-correlation normaliz-
ing factor to remove the effects of auto-correlation resulting
in a more consistent detection scheme. In addition, this paper
focuses on applying LTV Dynamic Watermarking to AVs
performing complex motions both in high-fidelity simulation
and in a real-world experiment as illustrated in Figure 1.
A. Vulnerability of Autonomous Vehicles
AV’s have been touted as a way to increase safety by
removing driver error. However, like other CPS, AVs are
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vulnerable to cyber-attack, that give rise to additional safety
concerns [5]–[7]. Some cyber-attacks can even compromise
the control systems of the AV. We divide these into two
categories: direct attacks, which seek to gain full control
of the AV, and deception attacks, which instead focus on
attacking communications to alter the AV’s perception of its
surroundings.
1) Direct Attacks: AVs use on-board computers to handle
sensor measurements and actuator inputs. As a result, a
hacker can take full control of the vehicle by compromising
the security of these computers. Though modern cars have
few avenues for accessing the on-board computer, they have
been shown to be susceptible to hacking through wirelessly
connecting to the infotainment system [8] or through a
wireless receiver connected to the diagnostic port [9].
2) Deception Attacks: To detect obstacles and localize
themselves, AVs use some combination of cameras, light
detection and ranging (LiDAR), and GPS each of which has
their own vulnerabilities. While cameras are susceptible to
glare [10], further vulnerabilities lie in deceiving the object
classifier that is run on the resulting images [11]. Moreover,
fabricated LiDAR returns can be injected via lasers in an
efficient enough manner to fool object detection algorithms
[12]. Lastly, GPS measurements are susceptible to spoofing
attacks with commercially available hardware [13].
B. Attack Detection Algorithms
This paper focuses on a particular detection method,
Dynamic Watermarking, which adds a watermark signal
to the control input to secure the measurement signals
[4], [14]–[18]. Dynamic Watermarking is an active method
meaning it makes alterations to the system which allow it to
detect more complex attacks [19]–[21]. While, the specific
methods of Dynamic Watermarking vary, in one popular
approach the watermark is a multivariate Gaussian sequence
that is generated by the controller. These works present their
detection schemes using two forms of tests: asymptotic tests,
which provide guarantees of detection in infinite time, and
statistical tests, which use the motivation of the asymptotic
tests to form an implementable real-time attack detection
scheme. Both forms use the measurement residual, defined
as the difference between the measurement and the expected
measurement, by considering its covariance and correlation
with the watermark.
Recently, Dynamic Watermarking was extended to LTV
systems by Porter et al. [4]. However, this extension requires
the effect of the control input to be visible in the measure-
ment signal immediately. As a result, systems that do not fit
this requirement such as those with distributed sensing and
control are unable to use this extension. Additionally there
is no consideration for the effect of auto-correlation of the
measurement residual. While auto-correlation remains con-
sistent for LTI Dynamic Watermarking, there is no guarantee
of consistency for the LTV case. Furthermore, this extension
only provides proof of concept using a kinematic vehicle
model with added Gaussian noise.
C. Contributions
The contributions of this paper are four-fold. First, a
relaxed version of the requirement for inputs to be visible in
a single step is provided. Using the less constrictive require-
ment, we show that the resulting asymptotic tests maintain
the same detection guarantees. Second, an auto-correlation
normalizing factor is derived for use in the statistical tests to
ensure that the resulting test metric is unaffected by the time-
varying auto-correlation of the measurement residual. Third,
LTV Dynamic Watermarking is applied to a high fidelity car
model in CarSim™. Fourth, LTV Dynamic Watermarking is
applied to a 1/10 scale autonomous rover. In each case the
vehicle performs a path following task for a predefined path
with time-varying velocity and turning radii. A replay attack,
which replays previously recorded measurements, is then
shown to be detectable using LTV Dynamic Watermarking.
The simulation and the experiment are repeated several times
to show the consistency of detection.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II covers the notation used throughout the paper.
Section III defines the LTV system and attack model.
Sections IV provides an overview of the asymptotic tests
developed by Porter et al. [4] and the proposed asymptotic
tests. Sections V provides an overview of the statistical test
developed by Porter et al. [4] and the proposed statistical
test. Sections VI and VII validate these methods through
simulated experiments in CarSim™and physical experiments
on a 1/10 scale autonomous rover, respectively.
II. NOTATION
The 2-norm of a vector x is denoted ‖x‖. Similarly, the
2-norm of a matrix X is denoted ‖X‖. The trace of a matrix
X is denoted tr(X). Zeros matrices of dimension i × j are
denoted 0i×j and in the case that i = j the notation is
simplified to 0i. Identity matrices of dimension i are denoted
Ii.
The Wishart distribution with scale matrix Σ and i degrees
of freedom is denoted W(Σ, i) [22, Section 7.2]. The multi-
variate Gaussian distribution with mean µ and covariance Σ
is denoted N (µ,Σ). The matrix Gaussian distribution with
mean M, and parameters Σ and Ω is denoted N (M,Σ,Ω).
The expectation of a random variable a is denoted E[a].
Given a sequence of random variables {ai}∞i=1, convergence
in probability is denoted p-limi→∞ai [23, Definition 7.2.1].
III. LTV SYSTEM AND ATTACK MODEL
This section provides an overview of the LTV system and
attack model used by Porter et al. [4]. Consider an LTV
system with state xn, measurement yn, process noise wn,
measurement noise zn, watermark en, additive attack vn,
and stabilizing feedback that uses the observed state xˆn
xn+1 = Anxn +BnKnxˆn +Bnen + wn (1)
yn = Cnxn + zn + vn (2)
where xn, xˆn, wn ∈ Rp, en ∈ Rq , yn, zn, vn ∈ Rr, and
x0 = 0p×1. Note, the initial condition of zero is not neces-
sary since the effects of a non-zero initial condition would
asymptotically decay under the assumption of stability. How-
ever, this assumption eases notation. The process noise wn,
measurement noise zn, and watermark en are mutually
independent and take the form wn ∼ N (0p×1,Σw,n), zn ∼
N (0r×1,Σz,n), and en ∼ N (0q×1,Σe). While the process
and measurement noise are unknown to the controller, the
watermark signal is generated by the controller and is known.
For simplicity, define A¯n = (An + BnKn) and A¯(n,m) =
A¯n · · · A¯m for n ≥ m and A¯(n,n+1) = Ip. Then make the
following assumption.
Assumption III.1. The covariances Σe, Σw,n, and Σz,n, of
the random variables used in (1)-(2), are full rank. Further-
more, there exists positive constants ηw, ηz, ηA¯, ηB , ηC ∈ R
such that ‖Σw,n‖ < ηw, ‖Σz,n‖ < ηz , ‖A¯n‖ < ηA¯ < 1,
‖Bn‖ < ηB , and ‖Cn‖ < ηC , for all n ∈ N.
The assumption of bounded full rank covariances for the
process and measurement noise are satisfied for most systems
by modeling error and sensor noise. Furthermore, the input
and output matrices are often constrained to be finite by
sensor and actuator limits. Since the watermark covariance is
user defined, the assumption of full rank can be satisfied by
choosing a positive definite matrix. Additionally, since the
controller is user defined, the constraint on A¯n can often be
satisfied by proper choice of Kn. Then make the following
assumption.
Assumption III.2.
limi→∞ 1i
∑i−1
n=0 CnBn−1 6= 0r×q. (3)
Here, (3) guarantees a persistent correlation between the
measurement signal yn and the watermark signal en−1,
which has been delayed by a single time step. This ensures
that the watermark has a persistent measurable effect on the
measurement signal, which can then be used for validation
purposes. This assumption is later replaced in the proposed
tests.
The observer and the corresponding observer error, defined
as δn = xˆn − xn, satisfy
xˆn+1 = (A¯n + LnCn)xˆn +Bnen − Lnyn (4)
δn+1 = (An + LnCn)δn − wn − Ln(zn + vn), (5)
where xˆ0 = δ0 = 0p×1. For simplicity, define An = (An +
LnCn) and A(n,m) = An · · ·Am for n ≥ m and A(n,n+1) =
Ip.
Next, consider the expected value Σδ,n = E[δnδᵀn | vn =
0r×1, ∀n], which can be written as
Σδ,n =
∑n
i=0A(n−1,n−i+1)(Σw,n−i+
+ Ln−iΣz,n−iL
ᵀ
n−i)A
ᵀ
(n−1,n−i+1). (6)
The matrix normalization factor is then defined as
Vn = (CnΣδ,nC
ᵀ
n + Σz,n)
−1/2, (7)
which exists since Σz,n is full rank. For the LTV system,
the matrix normalization factor can be thought of as a time-
varying normalization for the covariance of the measurement
residual. Next, make the following assumption about the
observer.
Assumption III.3. There exists positive constants ηA, ηL,
ηδ, ηV ∈ R such that ‖An‖ < ηA < 1, ‖Ln‖ < ηL,
‖Σδ,n‖ < ηδ , and ‖Vn‖ < ηV , for all n ∈ N.
Since the observer is user defined, the assumptions on An
and Ln can often be satisfied for proper choice of Ln.
The bound on Σδ,n is satisfied since applying previous
assumptions to (6) results in an increasing geometric series
with finite bound. The assumption on Vn is satisfied by lower
bounding the eigenvalues of the measurement noise which
is often satisfied.
Next, consider an attack vn that satisfies
vn = α(Cnxn + zn) + Cnξn + ζn (8)
ξn+1 = A¯nξn + ωn, (9)
where α ∈ R is called the attack scaling factor, the false
state ξn ∈ Rp has process noise ωn ∈ Rp and measurement
noise ζn ∈ Rr that take the form ωn ∼ N (0p×1,Σω,n)
and ζn ∼ N (0r×1,Σζ,n) and are mutually independent with
each other and with wn and zn. When Σω,n and Σζ,n are
selected properly and the attack scaling parameter is −1,
this model describes a replay attack. While an attacker could
choose to allow the noise to have unbounded covariance, the
resulting attack would be trivial to detect. Therefore, make
the following assumption about the attack model.
Assumption III.4. When there is an attack, vn follows
the dynamics (8)-(9) with the attack scaling factor remain-
ing constant. Furthermore, there exists positive constants
ηω, ηη ∈ R such that ‖Σω,n‖ < ηω, ‖Σζ,n‖ < ηζ , for all
n ∈ N.
Though in a real-world attack the attacker could likely start
and stop the attack as desired, attacks that are not consistently
present are impossible to detect every time due to the noise
in the system. As a result, some notion of the persistence
must be defined to make asymptotic guarantees of detection.
LTV Dynamic Watermarking uses the following definition to
describe the persistence of an attack.
Definition III.5. The asymptotic attack power is defined as
p-limi→∞
1
i
∑i−1
n=0 v
ᵀ
nvn. (10)
Here, an asymptotic attack power greater than 0 is considered
to be a persistent attack.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC TESTS
This section describes the asymptotic tests developed by
Porter et al. [4] and the proposed asymptotic tests which
include a relaxed form of Assumption III.2. In each case,
the tests are proven to detect the generalized replay attack
described in (8)-(9) in infinite time.
A. Previous Asymptotic Tests
The asymptotic guarantee of detection for the tests devel-
oped by Porter et al. [4] are defined in the following theorem.
Theorem IV.1. [4, Theorem III.6] Consider an attacked LTV
system satisfying the dynamics in (1)-(2) and (4)-(5). Let Vn
be as defined in (7). If vn = 0r×1 ∀n, then
p-limi→∞
1
i
∑i−1
n=0 Vn(Cnxˆn − yn)eᵀn−1 = 0r×q (C1)
and
p-limi→∞
1
i
∑i−1
n=0 Vn(Cnxˆn − yn)(Cnxˆn − yn)ᵀV ᵀn = Ir.
(C2)
Furthermore, if the attack follows the dynamics in (8)-(9)
and has non-zero asymptotic power as defined in (10), then
(C1) and (C2) cannot both be satisfied.
Note, the LHS of (C1) and (C2) can be used to guarantee
detection of generalized replay attacks with non-zero asymp-
totic power in infinite time. Since the statistical tests consider
only a finite number of steps at a time, the sample averages
of the measurement residuals covariance and correlation with
the watermark are more likely to be closer to the RHS of
(C1) and (C2) when no attack is present. As a result, the test
becomes more sensitive.
B. Proposed Asymptotic Tests
To relax the requirement made in Assumption III.2, we
instead consider the following assumption.
Assumption IV.2. There exists κ ∈ N such that
limi→∞ 1i
∑i−1
n=0 CnA¯(n−1,n−κ+1)Bn−κ 6= 0r×q. (11)
Here (11) guarantees a persistent correlation between the
measurement signal yn and the watermark signal en−κ which
has been delayed by κ time steps. This allows for systems
that require more than a single step for the watermark to have
a persistent measurable effect on the measurement signal.
Next we replace Theorem IV.1 with the following theorem.
Theorem IV.3. Consider an attacked LTV system satisfying
the dynamics in (1)-(2) and (4)-(5). Let Vn be as defined
in (7) and κ be the smallest value for which (11) holds. If
vn = 0r×1 ∀n, then
p-limi→∞
1
i
∑i−1
n=0 Vn(Cnxˆn − yn)eᵀn−κ = 0r×q (C1)
and
p-limi→∞
1
i
∑i−1
n=0 Vn(Cnxˆn − yn)(Cnxˆn − yn)ᵀV ᵀn = Ir.
(C2)
Furthermore, if the attack follows the dynamics in (8)-(9)
and has non-zero asymptotic power as defined in (10), then
(C1) and (C2) cannot both be satisfied.
Note, the delay of en−κ in (C1) has been changed but
the guarantees of the theorem remain the same. The proof
of Theorem IV.3 follows the same format as the proof of
Theorem IV.1 but uses the following theorem in place of [4,
Theorem III.7].
Theorem IV.4. Consider an attacked LTV system satisfying
the dynamics in (1)-(2) and (4)-(5) and an attack model
satisfying (8)-(9). Let Vn be as defined in (7), and κ being
the smallest value for which (11) holds. (C1) holds if and
only if the attack scaling factor α is equal to 0.
The proof for Theorem IV.4 is found in the appendix.
V. STATISTICAL TESTS
This section describes the statistical test developed by
Porter et al. [4] and the proposed statistical test which
uses Assumption IV.2 in place of Assumption III.2 and
the auto-correlation normalizing factor. The addition of this
normalizing factor is then shown to provide a more consistent
test metric for an example LTV system.
A. Previous Statistical Test
While Section IV provides necessary background for LTV
Dynamic Watermarking, infinite limits are not well suited for
real time attack detection. This section derives a statistical
test using a sliding window approach. Let
ψn =
[
Vn(Cnxˆn − yn)
en−1
]
(12)
and
Qn = [ψn−` . . . ψn][ψn−` . . . ψn]ᵀ. (13)
where `+1 is the window size, ` ∈ N, and ` ≥ q+r−1. Note,
ψn is asymptotically uncorrelated and identically distributed
such that ψn ∼ N (0q+r×1, S), for n = 1, 2, 3, · · · where
S =
[
Ir 0r×q
0q×r Σe
]
. (14)
Therefore, under the assumption of no attack, the distribution
of Qn approaches a Wishart distribution with `+1 degrees of
freedom and scale matrix S as ` goes to infinity. Furthermore,
for a generalized replay attack with non-zero asymptotic
power, Theorem IV.1 proves that the scale matrix for Qn
is no longer S since either (C1) or (C2) is not satisfied. The
Wishart distribution can then be used to define a statistical
test using the negative log likelihood of the scale matrix S
given the sampled matrix Qn:
L(Qn) = (q + r − `) log(|Qn|) + tr(S−1Qn). (15)
For a user defined threshold, a negative log likelihood greater
than the threshold raises an alarm.
In theory, if the process and measurement noise covari-
ances Σw,n and Σz,n are known, Vn can be calculated using
(6)-(7). In practice, these covariances are difficult to estimate
which can lead to error in the estimate of Vn. To reduce
this error, Vn can be directly estimated using the ensemble
average
Vn ≈
(
1
i
∑i
j=1(Cnxˆ
(j)
n − y(j)n )(Cnxˆ(j)n − y(j)n )ᵀ
)−1/2
(16)
Fig. 2. The LTV system in Example V.1 is simulated 200 times and the negative log likelihood is generated with the auto-correlation normalizing factor,
Gn, (left) and without the auto-correlation normalizing factor (right).
where the superscript (j) is the index of the realization
and the approximation improves as i becomes larger. This
approximation is appropriate since by the weak law of large
numbers we have that when no attack is present
p-limi→∞
1
i
∑i
j=1(Cnxˆ
(j)
n − y(j)n )(Cnxˆ(j)n − y(j)n )ᵀ =
= CnΣδ,nC
ᵀ
n + Σz,n (17)
and Vn is defined as in (7).
B. Modified Statistical Test
By adding an auto-correlation normalizing factor, denoted
Gn, and the delay of κ to the watermark, the proposed
statistical test is as follows. Let
ψn =
[
Vn(Cnxˆn − yn)
en−κ
]
and Pn =
[
ψn−` . . . ψn
]
, (18)
where ` + 1 is the window size, ` ∈ N, and ` ≥ q + r − 1.
Then Pn is distributed according to
Pn ∼ N (0(`+1)×(q+r), S,Gn), (19)
where S is as defined in (14) and
Gn =
E[PᵀnPn]
tr(S) . (20)
We can calculate the elements of Gn as
E[ψᵀj+iψj ]
tr(S) =
E[ψᵀj ψj+i]
tr(S) =
=
tr(Cᵀj V
ᵀ
j Vj+iCj+iAj+i−1...AjΣδ,j)+tr(Σe)
tr(S) +
+
tr(V ᵀj Vj+iCj+iAj+i−1...Aj+1LjΣz,j)
tr(S) . (21)
Finally, by Kollo and Rosen [24, Theorem 2.4.1] we have
that
Qn = PnG
−1
n P
ᵀ
n ∼ Wq+r(S, `+ 1). (22)
Note, due to the addition of the auto-correlation normalizing
factor, Qn is distributed according to a Wishart distribution
for all ` ≥ q + r − 1 instead of only approaching a Wishart
distribution. Furthermore, for a generalized replay attack of
non-zero asymptotic power, Theorem IV.3 proves that the
scale matrix for Qn is no longer S since either (C1) or (C2)
is not satisfied. Using this new definition of Qn the statistical
test follows that of (15). Note, Allowing Gn to be I(`+1) for
all n ∈ N and assuming κ = 1 results in the statistical test
provided by Porter et al. [4].
To avoid compounding error from estimated process and
measurement noise, Gn can be directly estimated using the
ensemble average
Gn ≈ 1i
∑i
j=1
(P (j)n )
ᵀ
P (j)n
tr(S) , (23)
where the superscript (j) is the index of the realization
and the approximation improve as i becomes larger. This
approximation is appropriate since when no attack is present
p-limi→∞
1
i
∑i
j=1
ψ(j)ᵀn ψ
(j)
n+k
tr(S) =
E[ψᵀnψn+k]
tr(S) . (24)
To illustrate the effect of the auto-correlation normalizing
factor consider the following example.
Example V.1. Consider an LTV system satisfying the dynam-
ics in (1)-(2) where vn = 0 for all n, wn ∼ N (03×1, 1 ×
10−3I3), zn ∼ N (02×1, 1× 10−3I2), en ∼ N (0, 1× 10−3),
An =
1 1 + 12 sin( n100 ) 00 1 0.1
0 0 1
 , (25)
Bn =
[
0 0 1
]ᵀ
, (26)
Cn =
[
1 0 0
0 1 0
]
, (27)
and
Kn =
[−4× 10−4 −3.65× 10−2 −1.05× 10−1] .
(28)
Furthermore consider an observer satisfying (4) where
Ln =
 −7× 10−2 −1−2.2× 10−3 −1.4× 10−1
−1.6× 10−3 −4.5× 10−2
 . (29)
Note, for this system κ is 2. The test metric was generated for
200 simulated realizations both with and without the auto-
correlation normalizing factor Gn for a window size of 20
(` = 19).
Fig. 3. The simulated high fidelity car is attacked with a replay attack after 50 s of operation. The desired trajectory and 10 attacked realizations are
plotted for the region that the attack is initiated (left). Negative log likelihood for all 200 attacked realizations with average value are plotted (right).
As illustrated in Figure 2, the addition of the auto-
correlation normalizing factor has little effect on the average
of the negative log likelihood. However, this normalizing
factor does improve the consistency by removing anomalies
in many of the realizations caused by auto-correlation.
VI. SIMULATED RESULTS
This section illustrates the effectiveness of LTV Dy-
namic Watermarking using a high fidelity vehicle model
in CarSim™. For the simulation, the vehicle completes a
1,137 m long trajectory traveling at speeds up to 7 m/s in
approximately 200 s. This is accomplished using a linear
quadratic regulator (LQR) and a linearization of the car
model [25]. The simulated measurement signal at step n
includes the ground plane coordinates (xc,n, yc,n) in meters,
heading ψn in radians, longitudinal velocity v1,n in meters
per second, lateral velocity v2,n in meters per second, yaw
rate ψ˙n in radians per second, and steering wheel angle δn
in radians. Since the feedback from the simulation does not
include noise, Gaussian measurement noise was added to the
measurement such that when no attack is present
yn =
[
xc,n yc,n ψn v1,n v2,n ψ˙n δn
]ᵀ
+ zn,
(30)
where
zn ∼ N
(
07×1, 1× 10−8I7
)
. (31)
The control signal sent to the simulation includes percent
throttle u, steering wheel rate δ˙ in radians per second. A
watermark with covariance
Σe =
[
0.015 0
0 0.015
]
(32)
was added to the control input at each step. The matrix nor-
malizing factor and the auto-correlation normalizing factor
were generated from 200 realizations using (16) and (23).
The window size of 21 steps (` = 20) was used for the
statistical tests. For this window size, a threshold of 181.94
was used based on a false alarm rate of 0.002 for the un-
attacked trials.
To generate a replay attack, the measurement signal from
one run is recorded and then played back when the sim-
ulation is run for a separate realization. Since an attack
need not start at the beginning, we chose to start the attack
50s after the start of the simulation. Furthermore, since the
initial replayed measurement may be inconsistent with what
is expected given the current observed state of the system,
the attacked measurement instead was linearly interpolated
between the true measurement and the replayed measurement
over the course of 0.15s.
In practice, an autonomous vehicle would respond to the
detection of an attack. We instead allowed the vehicle to
continue normal operation up to a certain distance from the
desired trajectory. This allows us to illustrate the results of
a replay attack on an autonomous vehicle.
The results of these simulations can be seen in Figure 3.
The left side of the figure shows the results of the replay
attack on our high fidelity car model. The right side of the
figure shows the ability of LTV Dynamic Watermarking to
detect these attacks. Note, despite our attempt to smooth the
transition to the replayed attack the negative log likelihood
has a spike immediately following the start of the attack at 50
s. Moreover, the negative log likelihood continues to exceed
the threshold as the attack continues and the transient effect
of the transition diminishes.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section further illustrates the effectiveness of LTV
Dynamic Watermarking on a 1/10 scale autonomous rover.
For the experiment, the rover completes a lap around a track
consisting of several turns and changes in velocity. The track
has a length of 38.8 m and the rover travels at speeds up to
1.8 m/s. This is accomplished using a LQR and a linearized
rover model. The measurement signal at step n includes
the ground plane coordinates (xc,n, yc,n) in meters, heading
ψn in radians, angular velocity ψ˙n in radians per second,
and longitudinal velocity v1,n in meters per second. The
ground plane coordinates and heading are measured using
a motion capture system, the angular velocity is measured
by an imu, and the longitudinal velocity is measured by
Fig. 4. The 1/10 scale autonomous rover is attacked with a replay attack after 15 s of operation. The desired trajectory and 10 attacked realizations are
plotted for the region that the attack is initiated (left). Negative log likelihood for all 20 attacked realizations with average value are plotted (right).
the motor controller. The control signal includes a desired
speed in meters per second and a steering angle in radians.
A watermark with covariance
Σe =
[
0.02 0
0 0.005
]
(33)
was added to the control input at each step. The matrix nor-
malizing factor and the auto-correlation normalizing factor
were generated from 100 experimental runs using (16) and
(23). The window size of 15 steps (` = 14) was used for the
statistical tests. For this window size, a threshold of 175.28
was used based on a false alarm rate of 0.002 for the un-
attacked trials.
Implementation of the replay attack was done in the same
fashion as was done in simulation except the attack was
initiated at 15 s. For safety purposes, the rover is remotely
stopped when the attack causes it to leave the track area.
The results of these experiments can be seen in Figure 4.
Similar to the simulated results, the left side of the figure
shows the results of the replay attack on the 1/10 scale
autonomous rover. Furthermore, the right of the figure shows
the ability of LTV Dynamic Watermarking to detect these
attacks. Note, the transition to the replayed measurements has
a lesser effect on the negative log likelihood. Nonetheless,
the negative log likelihood continues to exceed the threshold
as the attack continues ensuring detection.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper relaxes the requirement for inputs to be visible
in a single step and derives an auto-correlation normalizing
factor for LTV Dynamic Watermarking. The new normal-
izing factor is proven to remove the auto-correlation of
the residuals to solidify the statistical background of the
implementable test. The effectiveness of the new normalizing
factor is shown using an example. Furthermore, this paper
provides proof of concept for LTV Dynamic Watermarking
using both a high-fidelity car model in CarSim™and a 1/10
scale autonomous rover. In each case, a replay attack is
implemented in the middle of a trajectory following task,
and LTV Dynamic Watermarking is shown to quickly detect
the attack in a repeatable fashion.
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APPENDIX
Proof. (Theorem IV.4) Assume that α is equal to 0. Then
(C1) holds by the same reasoning as for the proof of the
original theorem [4, Theorem III.7].
Now assume that (C1) holds. Rearranging (C1) using (2),
(5), and (8) results in
p-limi→∞
1
i
∑i−1
n=0 Vn(Cnxˆn − yn)eᵀn−κ =
= p-limi→∞
1
i
∑i−1
n=0 Vn(Cnδn − (1 + α)zn+
− αCnxn − Cnξn − ζn)eᵀn−κ.
(34)
Note,
p-limi→∞
1
i
∑i−1
n=0 Vn(−(1 + α)zn − Cnξn − ζn)eᵀn−κ = 0r×q
(35)
by Porter et al. [4, Corrolary A.7.] since zn, ζn, ξn and
en−κ are mutually independent and satisfy the necessary
auto-correlation bound. Then by Porter et al. [4, Theorem
A.4.] we can cancel these terms resulting in
p-limi→∞
1
i
∑i−1
n=0 Vn(Cnxˆn − yn)eᵀn−κ =
= p-limi→∞
1
i
∑i−1
n=0 Vn(Cnδn − αCnxn)eTn−κ.
(36)
Expanding xn, δn in (36) by κ + 1 steps using (1) and (5)
then collecting all terms that do not depend on en−κ−1 and
denoting them an results in
p-limi→∞
1
i
∑i−1
n=0 Vn(Cnxˆn − yn)eᵀn−κ =
= p-limi→∞
1
i
∑i−1
n=0 Vn
(
an+
− α
κ−1∑
j=0
Mj,nCn−jA¯(n−j−1,n−κ+1)Bn−κen−κ
)
eᵀn−κ.
(37)
where Mj,n ∈ Rr×r is a bounded linear transform due to
the dynamics being bounded and κ being finite. Moreover,
M0,n = Ir and due to our choice of κ terms for j > 0 can
be cancelled by Porter et al. [4, Theorem A.4.] since they
converge to 0q,r by Porter et al. [4, Corollary a.7.] resulting
in
p-limi→∞
1
i
∑i−1
n=0 Vn(Cnxˆn − yn)eᵀn−κ =
= p-limi→∞
1
i
∑i−1
n=0 Vn
(
an+
− αCnA¯(n−1,n−κ+1)Bn−κen−κ
)
eᵀn−κ. (38)
Then by Porter et al. [4, Corollary A.7.] we have that
p-limi→∞
1
i
∑i−1
n=0−αVnCnA¯(n−1,n−κ+1)Bn−κ×
× (en−κeᵀn−κ − Σe) = 0q×r. (39)
Therefore by Porter et al. [4, Theorem A.4.] we have
p-limi→∞
1
i
∑i−1
n=0 Vn(Cnxˆn − yn)eᵀn−κ =
= p-limi→∞
1
i
∑i−1
n=0 Vnane
ᵀ
n−κ+
− αVnCnA¯(n−1,n−κ+1)Bn−κΣe. (40)
Note, that all elements of
Vnane
ᵀ
n−κ (41)
are distributed symmetrically about 0 for all n ∈ N since an
is a zero mean Gaussian random vector. Consider an element
of (40) for which the corresponding element in
1
i
∑i−1
n=0 VnCnA¯(n−1,n−κ+1)Bn−κΣe (42)
does not converge. For each i, the probability that the matrix
element in (40) is farther away from 0 than the corresponding
element in (42) is at least 0.5. Therefore the element cannot
converge in probability to 0 completing the proof. 
